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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1976 I have examined the movement to re-form dispute
ideology in the United States. Two aspects of my work have demonstrated
1) the existence and force of the movement to "trade justice for harmony"
in legal practice and 2) the ideological nature of the movement, as
demonstrated by numerous studies, which show both that the "litigation
explosion" was an ideological construct, and that Alternative Dispute
Resolution is not a universally desired improvement, but rather an often
coercive mechanism of pacification. In this paper I ask a new question:
Why did (do) members of the legal elite accept this ideological take-over
of their profession with such equanimity?'
While in previous work I examine harmony ideology at work on
unsuspecting citizens, I will argue in this article that harmony ideology -
the use of a rhetoric of peace through consensus - finds fertile ground
within the legal profession through cultural control. Social control relates
to "intense influence," working extraordinarily long hours with little
contact with the outside world, and also focuses on hierarchy: The Chief
Justice does not have to present evidence for lawyers to believe him.
Social and cultural power mechanisms amount to controlling processes.
Such control mechanisms have received inadequate attention both within
and without the legal profession. In the United States, we have
constitutional laws to protect us from overt acts of domination, and we
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1. This question was first posed in a talk I presented to the 45th Annual Judicial
Conference of the Fifth Judicial Circuit in Jackson, Mississippi, April 20, 1988. I
acknowledge with gratitude the help of colleagues and students - and in particular the eagle
eye of lawyer-anthropologistEllen Hertz - in clarifying the ideas in this paper.
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have activist lawyers who are alert to overt controls. However, there is
less protection from the insidious exercise of power through indirect
controlling processes. What anthropologists have learned over the past
fifty years is that it is exactly those symbols, placed by any society outside
the jurisdiction of its formal social control systems (what Aldous Huxley
in 1958 called "impersonal forces"), 2 that we find control operating most
adamantly. Yet, there is no compatible body of laws or activist concern
with covert power mechanisms - such as group think or ideological control
- which are so central a part of modernity, and which are accelerated by
commercial media and political organizations.
Legal scholars and lawyers should pay more attention to
controlling processes not only because of increasing incidences of thought
control allegations in legal suits involving cult and cult-like activities, but
also because the exercise of intense influence is so pervasive in late
twentieth-century America. Even lawyers and judges may be subjected to
intense influence under certain conditions.
Over the past twenty years lawyers and judges in the United
States have been pummeled in the popular media and in dispute resolution
journals by an accelerating wave of antagonism toward litigation and the
adversarial process. During the same period, enthusiasm for alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) has promoted these mechanisms as being
efficient, as providing access to resolution, and as exalting harmony rather
than rights. The intensity was striking and so was the impact. So
successful has the movement against litigation and the adversary process
been, that there has been widespread acceptance of a legal harmony model
of law as an answer to the concerns of how to deliver justice to the many.
The movement was not about theory. It was directed towards
practice. ADR was on the agenda of legal practitioners. Trial lawyers
met to ponder their complicitous part as promulgators of anger and the
adversary process. Federal judges bought into the reframing of what is
wrong with our legal system, and often indiscriminately accepted the ADR
analysis. Even stranger were the 1960's activist lawyers, who are now
born-again mediators who accept ADR forums and use them to erase
issues of class, gender, and race, to "treat people equally." By 1993,
ADR has become a major industry, which includes social workers, mental
health professionals, lawyers, behavioral scientists, and dozens of journals
2. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEw WORLD AND BRAVE NEW WORLD REVISTED
(1958).
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where ADR is formalized.'
The ADR rhetoric of the past two decades was a response to the
law reform discourse of the 1960s, a discourse concerned with justice and
root causes, and with debates over right and wrong. In the early 1970s,
when the justice talk of the various rights movements (civil rights,
consumer rights, environmental rights, etc.) was replaced by talk of
harmony and efficiency, the public debate was over the question of "too
much litigation." A change in the manner of thinking about rights and
justice was shaped through a new discourse, and by means of this
discourse produced a movement against the contentious or adversarial
qualities of American law. In some ways, it was a rebellion against law
and lawyers - often by lawyers themselves. A movement to control
litigation was being constructed to replace justice and rights talk with what
I call harmony ideology, the belief that harmony in the guise of
compromise or agreement is ipso facto better than an adversary posture.4
In any period of history, harmony ideology is accompanied by an
intolerance for conflict! The intention to prevent the expression of
discord rather than to deal with its cause takes on prominence. The
rationalization for ADR was from the outset articulated as protecting the
courts from the "garbage cases," such as gender, environmental, and
consumer cases, as well as protecting the courts from overload.' The
Harvard Law School was in the lead, and soon a plethora of new courses
and journals began to appear in law schools around the country, all of
which included training in alternative dispute resolution. After I
summarize the components that became the centerpiece of the ADR
movement, I will focus on the questions: Why have so many people in
the legal profession fallen prey to ADR rhetoric? Why did members of
3. See LAURA NADER, No ACCESS TO LAw (1980); see also John J. Dieffenbach,
Psychology, Society, and the Development of the Adversarial Posture, 7 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsp. RESOL. 261 (1992) (contrasting the adversarial system with cooperation and valuing the
latter as if such value were obvious); Laura Nader, Dispudng Without the Force of Law, 88
YALE LJ. 998 (1978) (summary of findings).
4. See Laura Nader, Harmony Models and the Construction of Law, in
REFORMULATING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 41-59 (Peter Black et al. eds., Wakeview Press
1991); see also LAURA NADER, HARMONY IDEOLOGY - JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTIC
MOUNTAIN VILLAGE (1990).
5. CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE (Roger Sanjek ed., 1986); JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 20 (1983); Laura Nader, A Litigious People, 22 LAW
AND SOCIETY 1017 (1988) (reviewing CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE
(1983)).
6. See Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future. Proceedings of the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice. (A.L. Levin and R.R. Wheeler, eds., 1979).
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the legal elite accept this ideological takeover of their profession with such
placidity? I argue that harmony ideology - manifested in the reluctance of
many lawyers to defend their profession against this ADR onslaught -
finds fertile ground through mechanisms of hierarchy and coercive
harmony.
In what follows, I sample settings related to influences in law
practice, in mediation, and in the large law firm, and indicate how
psychologists have cemented the disciplinary practices in law by means of
therapeutic language such as "bum-out. " Working extraordinarily long
hours, with little contact with the outside world, lawyers are particularly
susceptible to the kinds of control effects documented in cults. The
cultural control works first by playing on a rhetoric of peace and harmony,
a rhetoric with historic roots in American civic culture, and also through
training in hierarchy which begins with lawyers' first acquaintances with
law in law school and continues throughout their professional careers.
Both hierarchy and harmony discourse constitute a movement to covert
power mechanisms that have received inadequate attention in writings
about the legal profession.
II. THE ADR EXPLOSION s
Today ADR has a history and a scholarship. People from fields
as disparate as anthropology, history, psychology, law, and political
science have been piecing together the story of the movement. Whether
we speak of the work of Abel,' Harrington,1" Hofrichter," Nader,"
7. See Richard Ofshe and Margaret T. Singer, Attacks on Peripheral versus Central
Elements of Self and the Impact of Thought Reforming Techniques, 3 THE CELTIC STUD. J. 3
(1986); Trina GrlUo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE
LJ. 1545-1610 (1991); Richard Ofshe, Coercive Persuasion and Attitude Oange, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 212 (E.F. Borgotta and M.L. Borgotta eds., 1992).
8. The sub-title was inspired by John H. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 567 (1975).
9. Richard L. Abel, The Politics of Informal Justice, in 1 THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
(1982).
10. CHRISTINE B. HARRINOTON, SHADOW JUSTICE, (Contributions in Political Science,
no. 133) (1985).
11. RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALISTIC SOCIErY: THE
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE, (Contributions in Political Science, no. 171) (1987).
12. NADER, supra note 3.
CONTROLLING PROCESSES
Galanter,u Tomasic and Feeley", or others, the following questions are
often shared: By what means was an ADR movement launched in a
country where the rule of law was paramount? What have been the
consequences of the shift from adversarial to harmony ideology in terms of
the expressed purpose of law in the United States? What is the meaning
of harmony ideology in relation to unequal relationships, and more broadly
in terms of creating a culture of harmony which may be coercive,
repressive, and basically undemocratic? It is the third question that is of
interest in this paper.
Some might say that ADR is a hegemonic movement, in which
the exercise of political control working through a combination of
persuasion and force makes it appear as if persuasion is the predominant
feature. The movement was one based on rhetoric and style at first, only
later becoming legal practice. Acceptance of the rhetoric led to institution
building. By means of new apparatuses, changes in the handling of civil
cases came about - changes that functioned to suppress the realities of
class, gender, and racial antagonisms in the United States, while affording
efficiency and often cheaper dispute resolution for business. The image
was of a reformed and informal law unfractured by power differences. In
so far as it realized the opposite of its stated purpose, it was an unreal law
reform movement.
For my research, the turning point was 1976, the year of the
bicentennial celebration of the United States. During that year, the Roscoe
Pound Conference, "Perspectives on Justice in the Future," was held in St.
Paul, Minnesota, where Roscoe Pound delivered his long-remembered
1906 talk to the American Bar Association on "The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice."' The Pound
Conference brought together judges and staff from all of our fifty states in
what became a key social drama, the beginning of a serious attack on the
adversary process. The Conference was described as serving "to arouse a
new spirit... a new optimism about the possibility of creative innovation
in the administration of justice."" The presenters were law-trained, and
their messages covered the common theme of procedural reform from
13. Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L.
REv. 3 (1986).
14. ROBERT ToMAsIc AND MALCOLM FEELEY, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT
FOR EMERGENT IDEA (1982).
15. Roscoe Pound, 7he Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 29 A.B.A. 295 (1906).
16. Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future, supra note 6.
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adversarial to alternative dispute resolution.
I examine the presentationst and give specific attention to the
discourse because the Pound Conference was rich with a rhetoric designed
to accomplish what Burke called "the manipulation of men's beliefs for
political ends."" The rhetoric of ADR builds on the ideology of consent,
hiding relations of force behind the notions of persuasion and mutual
accord. The drama set the stage for the alternative dispute resolution
movement. Each man in turn spoke about some version of the following
complaints: The courts are crowded; American lawyers are too
adversarial and the American people too litigious; new tribunals are
needed to divert cases generated by the regulated welfare state;
"cumulative tinkering" should be adopted as a strategy, a way of creeping
in with reform. Furthermore, alternative dispute agencies were portrayed
as agencies of settlement or reconciliation, peace rather than war.
In the years following the Pound Conference, the public was
immersed in alternative dispute resolution rhetoric, which by the end of
the deca4e had the quality of discursive cement. Chief Justice Warren
Burger had set the tone for a change. In his work he was aided by
members of the American judiciary, leaders of the American Bar
Association, and the growing group of alternative dispute resolution
professionals." The rhetoric was restricted and formulaic, and its users
were assertive and repetitive. They made broad generalizations, invoked
authority and danger, and presented values as facts. The Chief Justice
warned that adversarial modes of conflict resolution were taring the
country apart, and that there had to be a better way." He claimed that
Americans were inherently litigious, and that ADR was more civilized
than the adversary process. His "Isn't There a Better Way?" speeches
followed the peremptory style of assertive rhetoric, grounding the use of
arbitration with reference to the time of Homer and Athenian law.
Pointing to the early uses of arbitration, he said lawyers should serve as
healers, rather than warriors, procurers, or hired guns. He also repeated
that Americans were the most litigious people on the globe. During his
time as Chief Justice, Burger continued to speak about lawyers as healers,
and plaintiffs as patients needing treatment; there was little talk of rights,
remedies, injustice, prevention, or unequal power.
17. See Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Legal
Reform, 8 WINDSOR Y.B. OF AccEss To JusTicE 269 (1988).
18. KENNETH BURKE, A RHEToRIc OF MOTIVEs 41 (University of Cal. Press 1969).
19. One could examine Society of Professionals In Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)
membership for a general sense of the range of ADR professionals.
20. Stuart Taylor Jr., Justice System Stifled by its Costs and its Complexity, Erpers
Warn, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1983, at Al.
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The framework of a harmony law model took hold. Justice
Burger was quoted as saying that "the nation was plagued 'with an almost
irrational focus - virtually a mania - on litigation as a way to solve all
problems.'"' Although there was common sense in Burger's speeches,
the fact that many of his declarations were not supportable did not seem to
matter. There was a momentum building. The ideology of harmony
began to be believed and to be institutionalized. By the late 1980s, the
newspapers, the major political speeches, the evangelical radio stations,
the latest insurance copy, all had some comment on the litigation explosion
and anti-litigation. The rhetoric was part of the formula central to
building a movement that would implement a harmony ideology of legal
reform. It did not hurt that there was a close fit between the rhetoric, the
ethic of Christian harmony, the interests of corporations in cutting legal
fees, psychologists and other therapists, the woman's movement, and a
myriad of vested interests. The harmony law model was for some anti-
law, anti-confrontation, anti-anger, and for many a response to the "too
many rights" movement. Furthermore, the ADR movement was being
spearheaded by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court.
I. THE CRmcs op ADR
Critics of the alternative reform movement since the mid 1970s
are abundant, many of them seeking to separate myth and rhetoric from
substantiated evidence. Because there are summaries of the leading
critical works elsewhere,' let me simply say here that a number of
critics provided evidence that challenged the assumptions of the Burger
rhetoric.' They compared the United States with other European
industrial democracies and concluded that the U.S. system of justice had
inadequate public investment. Half as much was spent per capita on U.S.
courts than in West Germany from 1960 to 1973. Two widely influential
articles questioned the assumption of a litigation explosion and concluded
there was no litigation explosion despite noticeable perceptions.' The
same studies found that per capita use of regular civil courts in the U.S.
was comparable to that of England, Australia, Denmark, and New
Zealand, although somewhat higher than Germany and Sweden and far
21. Id.
22. Nader, supra note 17.
23. See generally Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Scholarship, Sociolegal Change:
Lessons from Galanter and the "Iitigaton Crisis," 21 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 677 (1988).
24. Id. at 680.
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higher than Japan, Spain, and Italy. According to these and other studies,
the "litigation explosion" is more folklore than fact. Others asked what is
so good about settlement or conversely, what is so bad about litigation?
25
After all, written law represents important normative conclusions about
substantive justice which ADR circumvents. Other critics follow the
contours and broader significance of the change and ask, as did Richard
Abel, "[i]s the ambit of state control contracting or expanding?"'
Consumers wrote outraged letters asking, when is arbitration really
arbitration in referring to the conflict of interest when arbitration panels
are sponsored, funded, and staffed by manufacturers and dealers. In many
cases, the consumer was "complaining to Ford about Ford." Clearly, we
need to differentiate more clearly when it is that we are improving dispute
resolution and when we are being subjected to intimidation, because the
more general finding is that successes in the field of alternatives are rare.
In addition, a series of studies began looking at ADR practice.
Judy Rothschild studied a neighborhood justice center in San Francisco and
wrote about the ideology of mediation. She noted that the ideology
depends upon a negative evaluation of the traditional legal system and that
it does not pursue the substantive aspects of conflict, nor identify standards
of justice. Disputants are trained to associate litigation with alienation,
hostility, and high cost.' On the other hand, the same neighborhood
justice center portrayed mediation as a process that "encourages civic and
community responsibility for dispute resolution," a defense against state
law.2 Rothschild observed that disputes are reshaped in the intake
process so that value conflicts or interest conflicts become "communication
problems." Facts about disputes and legal rights become disputes about
feelings and relationships. The model Rothschild describes is in good part
a therapeutic model. The difference between confrontations and violence
is blurred, and in harmony ideology anger appears to be inherently violent.
When mediation becomes a process of communication, justice is
measured by implicit standards of conformity, and as we will see, issues
of what is just become irrelevant. The potential plaintiff becomes the
25. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Seulement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984); Albert W.
Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for
a Two-Rer Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1817-18 (1986).
26. Abel, supra note 9, at 1.
27. Judy Rothschild, Mediation and Social Control (1986) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of California (Berkeley)). For a general
review of "neighborhood justice" see SALLY MERRY & NEAL MiNR ET AL., THE
POSSIBLrT OF PoPULAR JUsTICE (forthcoming Fall 1993).
28. See sources cited supra note 27.
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victim (or the patient), and the ethic of treatment prevails.'
Furthermore, treatment by means of mediation fictionalizes the conflict.
The reformulation of disputes shifts attention from employer negligence in
workers' compensation to the injured worker, in the context of a privatized
justice. Other studies began to show that, with the exception perhaps of
intracorporate cases, ADR processes were not being used as widely as
they might be.'
The hard sell stage was initiated to overcome public hesitancy and
resistance to using ADR.3 ADR became mandatory in many states, and
its ideology spread into the schools, therapy, business organizations,
hospitals, and every level of American life from the living room to the
board rooms, and even into the White House (where observers regularly
praise presidents for harmonious or mediating styles, rather than for
assertive leadership). Professors in universities are negatively measured
on their level of contentiousness, as are workers in white collar jobs,
irrespective of work performance. Both style and organizational changes
are imbued with conformist ideology, intolerant of dissent, what I have
called coercive harmony.
Cultural imperialism, the struggle for the control and the
construction of ideas for mind colonization purposes, is normally difficult
to track.' But in the case of harmony law, it is easier to comprehend
because much of what I describe is articulated in public spaces by means
of professional and media formats. The Pound Conference was published
and is now part of the public record. What has been less in the public eye
is how it works, the "it" in this case referring to an ideology constructed
with a practical purpose in mind. ADR was not meant to be abstract. A
body of critical work dealt with whether and how real is the litigation
explosion, or how great is the need for litigation.' The next research
thrust was directed to examining institutions that were engineered as part
of the ADR movement, institutions such as neighborhood justice centers or
29. Bjorn Claeson, The Privatization of Justice: An Ethnography of Control (1987)
(unpublished BA Honors Thesis, Department of Anthropology, University of California
(Berkeley)).
30. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 11; see also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes, supra note 13, at 4; Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, supra note
13, at 3.
31. See VERMONT LAW SCHOOL, A STUDY OF BARRIERS TO THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE
METHODS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984).
32. See EDWARD SAID, CULTURAL IMPERIALISM (1993) (calling attention to the
processes by which culture is controlled and constructed).
33. See HOFRICHTER, supra note 11; see also Galanter, Reading the Landscape of
Disputes, supra note 13, at 4; Galanter, Te Day After the Litigation Explosion, supra note
13, at 3.
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mediation settings, or older institutions like the Workingman's
Compensation Act, or the courts, or court-annexed arbitration units.34
Still others have made sporadic observations about the use of ADR by
corporate bodies. 5 In the examples that follow, the main features of
selection have been hierarchy and "soft" violence (where the manufacture
of consent induces a moral panic that covers up unequal power relations,
such as between men and women or junior and senior partners). I speak
here about the kind of indirect control that serves to make people mute or
afraid or both. Such control is exquisite as a powerful silencing
technique. Legal policies affect the live domination of ordinary people in
high and low places.
IV. How ADR AND HIERARCHY WORK AS
"SOF" VIOLENCE: MEDIATION
When Chief Justice Warren Burger mentioned healing as more
civilized behavior than contentiousness, he was, probably unwittingly,
reiterating a European imperialist tradition that used a hierarchy of
manners and public gesture to domesticate the subordinated and to insure
the absence of contestation in the colonies.? Burger's phrases might
appear trivial at first, but socializing people to silence by means of culture
is rarely trivial, especially in a democracy constructed around ideas of
free, open, and untrammeled debate. The manner in which ADR exploded
onto the national scene, and the rhetoric by which Justice Burger promoted
ADR, was seductive. Who could be against harmony or civilized behavior
or healing or efficiency? The appeal was to a broad audience, and many,
especially women, were attracted to the soft or gentle aspects of an
informal justice.
The women's movement of the 1970s and 1980s, replete with a
rhetoric of equality and relationships, was attracted to contextual rather
than rule-centered, abstract thought. Many women had voiced criticisms of
the family court system in the United States as a forum that could produce
just results in a respectful and humane manner. Indeed, mediation was put
forward as an alternative because it promised to be a feminist alternative
to the patriarchally inspired adversary system. Mediation of family cases
spread throughout the country and became mandatory in many states,
34. See Clacson, supra note 29.
35. See, e.g., EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURINO CONSENT
(1988).
36. See 1 NORBERT ELUAs, THE HISTORY OF MANNERS: THE CIVIIZING PROCESS
(Edmund Jephcott trans., 1978).
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including California.3'
In 1991, Trina Grillo, a law professor and mediator, published
the first seething critique of mandatory mediation in relation to the
inherently dangerous aspects of what she calls "process dangers" for
women.' The fact that her article appeared in the Yale Law Journal is
important because of its visibility and prestige. Central to Grillo's critique
is the relation of law to the promises of mediation in family disputes
involving men, women, and the custody of their children. Grillo measures
the promise of the form, in this case mediation, against real cases and not
abstract rules and hypothetical cases. She also measures mediation against
adversarial justice in court trials.
Mediation promised centrality accorded to context; it was to have
a place for emotion as well as rationality, and the parties were supposed to
participate in determining their future. However, Grillo's work is about
how mediation operates as control, control in defining the problem,
control of speech and expression, and control over public record.'
Mediation is a process that is confidential rather than public. Her analysis
is both cultural and legal. She is pointed in her assessment of formal
equality as a destroyer of social context and speaks of the destruction of
rights that accompanies the limitation of discussion of fault and past facts
in the case. She is most concerned with what happens when mediators
frame cases between partners as equal control, when there is unequal
responsibility. 4 Important also are her observations on the suppression
of anger in mediation sessions, especially the prohibitions on female
anger.4 ' Grillo calls our attention to the notion of separateness that
accompanies the expression of anger in a society where the idea of "the
couple" prevails in definitions of male-female relations.' Finally, she
states that choice of process is sabotaged by forced engagement; she sees
mandatory mediation as a dangerous environment within which patriarchy
and prejudice can flourish. 4
Grillo's paper is brilliant because it requires a certain openness
and brightness of mind to grasp indirect control patterns and to articulate
37. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (Deering 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 752 (West 1992); and OR. REV. STAT. § 107.179 (1991). Many other states have enacted
statutes where mediation of family cases is at the court's discretion. See, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 46b-53a (West 1992).
38. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1607-10.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1569-72.
41. Id. at 1574-77.
42. Id. at 1577-79.
43. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1600-07.
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their functioning.' As noted earlier, Grillo is both a law professor and a
mediator, but not everybody makes such a powerful argument against
mandatory mediation, or for a mediation that meets the truth in advertising
standard. The model she is attacking is less one of law than of therapy,
for as she notes "[t]he movement for voluntary mediation of divorce
disputes began several decades ago as lawyers and therapists offered to
help their clients settle their cases in a nonadversarial manner."' For the
mediation movement, the point was not just to help clients, but to help
them in a nonadversarial manner. It was the forum that attained first
importance.
In 1961-62 when Lon Fuller discussed "The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication," he was arguing that different problems require different
solutions; he was not as much interested in whether something was settled
in an adversary mode or not.' For Fuller, there is nothing inherently
humane about one forum or another. It depends on what is before the
"tribunal." It also depends on the consequences that follow. Yet, several
decades later we find his pragmatism supplanted by a forum fetish, for
which it is the forum that is or is not humane. Unlike Fuller, who is more
or less working through the philosophical reasoning about adjudication, or
Grillo, who is looking at consequences in real cases and about real people,
Josh Rosenberg, also a law professor and mediator, writes a critique of
Grillo's article called In Defense of Mediation.47 In his work, Rosenberg
uses the same formulaic Burger rhetoric: "[m]ediation has won praise
from the bar, from numerous participants and practitioners and from
scholars as a tremendous breakthrough in dispute resolution."' He uses
metaphoric imagery in referring to "Grillo's horror stories," and a
rhetorical trick to dismiss serious discussion of consequences: "[Tihere is
much in life that has the potential to do great damage. " '
Mandatory mediation abridges American freedom because it is
often outside the law, eliminates choice of procedure, removes equal
protection before an adversary law, and is generally hidden from view.
The situation is much like that in psychotherapy, little regulation and little
accountability. Mind control activities operate best in isolation, and those
44. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPUNE AND PUNISH, (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed.,
Pantheon Books 1977) (1975).
45. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1551 (footnote omitted).
46. Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (1961-1962) (unpublished
manuscript, Harvard Law School). Fuller's 'unpublished" paper was widely circulated. A
later version was published in 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
47. Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediadon, 33 AREZ. L. REV. 467 (1991).
48. Id. at 467.
49. Id. at 470.
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who have read the literature on influence understand that people in life
crises are vulnerable to coercive influence." Divorce is one such life
crisis. The mediation model described by Grillb is one belonging to the
mental health professionals, so it is not surprising that the civil plaintiff
becomes a patient.
The informal law of mediation is unwritten, which adds to the
potential for abuse, and is for the most part unconsciously perceived. It is
a process that often operates with the notion of moral minimalism "in
which people prefer the least extreme reactions to offenses and are
reluctant to exercise any social control against one another at all. "
Under such conditions, couples are treated as if they were equal and it
becomes irrelevant whether one member had abused, deceived, or
otherwise oppressed the other. Discussion of blame or rights is avoided
and replaced by the rhetoric of compromise and relationship; cultural
notions of justice are factored out. As Grillo says, mediation becomes a
"mutually regulated dance between oppressor and oppressed, " ' thereby
obscuring issues of unequal social power.
In a manner that is gripping, Grill describes the exercise of a
technique which discourages people from asserting their rights when they
have been injured. She reminds us that rights assertion cannot flourish
when discussion of fault and the past are not permitted. A sense of
disentitlement flattens the desire to seek redress. Like psychotherapy, the
mediation model focuses on the individual, and assumes that the parties, as
opposed to social ills, are responsible for all family problems. Flattening
by insistence on formal equality is a subtle and powerful control because it
is supported by American equality ideology. It is assumed, for example,
that both parents are equally competent to take care of the children
because discussion of fault and past is limited, evidence to the contrary is
not entered. The consequences can be devastating for both mother and
child. Grillo notes, "[t]he insistence of a mother that a young child not be
permitted to stay overnight with an alcoholic father who smokes in bed
might be characterized as a mother needing to stay in control."' Her
observation that mediation does not take anger seriously enough is also
50. See, e.g., Margaret T. Singer and Richard Ofshe, Thought Reform Programs and
the Production of Psychiatric Casualties, 20 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 188 (1990). Margaret T.
Singer is a psychologist and therapist who has published widely on issues of intense influence
as used in cults and as found in the cloak of professionalism.
51. See M.P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB (1988).
52. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1561 (quoting Judith A. Libow et al., Feminist and Family
Systems Therapy: Are They Irreconcilable?, 10 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 3, 8 (1982)).
53. Id. at 1567.
54. Id. at 1568 (footnote omitted).
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arresting because today mainstream America assumes that anger is bad.
While there is in practice a possibility for the expression of anger in the
adversarial context because anger is often a key component in the
adversarial fight, in mediation sessions, expression of anger is discouraged
and its suppression is particularly directed at women. Grill finds this
suppression destructive of energy needed for coping with crisis.' Her
discussion of the social prohibitions against female angeru particularly
against women of color,' are astute observations from one who
understands, like Fuller, that there are limits to particular forums. In
Grillo's work, she argues that there are limits to what one can accomplish
with suppressing protest, or what conversely is possible from legitimate
expression of anger. Suppression of anger often leads to individual
paralysis, self-hatred, depression, or worse. Grillo's case against
mandatory mediation is a case against mind colonization, or intense
influence publicly condoned in private spaces.
V. How ADR AND HIERARCHY WORK As "SoFr" VIOLENCE:
THE LARGE CORPORATE LAW FIRM
At this point, I would like to move the discussion from family
conciliation issues to two settings in the practice of corporate law in order
to indicate the wide range of intense influence in corporate law practice.
One instance describes the manner in which corporate lawyers are
controlled, and the other takes a glimpse at the way in which workers in
that same law firm resist coercive harmony. In both instances, I am
dealing with ongoing ethnographic observations from several large,
international law firms in the San Francisco Bay Area. The research is
being conducted by a research associate interested in issues of control in
large law firms.' Most of the material which comes in the form of text,
either expression, stories, or complaint of all the workers, is also informed
55. Id. at 1576.
56. Id. at 1576-79.
57. Grillo, supra note 7, at 1579-81.
58. The reseatcher who provided me with the following data prefers to remain
anonymous until the work has reached completion. It should be noted that not all large law
firms have the same culture. See also Laura Nader, Up the Anthropologist - Perspectives
Gained by Studying Up, In REINVENTING ANTHROPOLOGY 284 (Dell H. Hymes ed., 1972)
(discussing the ethics of studying organizations that affect the lived domination of ordinary
people, in high and low places, "[w]e should not necessarily apply the same ethics developed
for studying foreign cultures, (where we are guests), to the study of institutions,
organizations, and bureaucracies that have a broad public impact.'); MARC GALANTER AND
THoMAs PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991).
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by Robert Nelson and Duncan Kennedy.-" The passages quoted at length
should inspire the reader to question the "normalness" of working
condition in such firms. The "what do you expect if you go to a big
firm?" attitude among law students further works as pacification.
Corporate attorneys in large firms are affected by a system of
cultural control which includes the concepts of "billable hours" and
"tracking systems." Billable hours are used to measure time, productivity,
and usefulness, and are indicators of future tenure with the firm. They are
used to measure conformity and adherence to the rules as well as one'g
allegiance to the practice of law. The tracking system is directly related to
billable hours, and is constructed to "weed out" those destined for
partnership and to recognize those who are not. In the instance of billable
hours, the total number of hours worked is measured, but special attention
is paid to the hours logged after 7 p.m., and on weekends. Extended
hours are highly valued and rewarded when yearly review comes about.
The more you produce, the more you are expected to produce, but "love
of law" has its measure. One senior associate told the following story:
On Mother's Day last year a lead partner in the firm had to
cancel his dinner engagement with his mother because a client
called him and kept him occupied on the telephone for several
hours. This was seen by some as truly real commitment to the
firm and "love of law!"'
The control becomes clearer in instances when an attorney does not
participate, that is, fails to bill the preordained number of hours as set by
predecessors and fellow associates. "You could lose your window office
and be put in the 'dungeon,' or your annual review can be affected and it
can be a cause for termination of employment.""'
If commitment does not extend beyond the hours of 9 a.m. to 6
p.m., one is ipso facto not a likely candidate for partnership. One
attorney who was given his sixth year review was told by the managing
partner of the firm:
59. See Robert L. NELSON, PARTNERS wrrH POWER (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Legal
Education as a Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLMICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
40 (David Kairys ed., 1982); see also Stewart Macaulay, Control, Influence, and Attitudes:
A Comment on Nelson, 37 STAN. L. REV. 553 (1985).
60. As discussed in footnote 58, this research was collected by a researcher who wishes
to remain anonymous. In anthropology, this method of data collection, participant
observation, is called ethnography.
61. Id.
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You have written many winning arguments and have
represented the firm in winning cases. However, you come in
at 9 and leave at 6, and rarely are you seen in the office on
weekends. You treat this like a job and not like a lifetime
commitment. You have a nonchalant attitude about your work
here.... Therefore, you will get the minimum annual raise,
and no bonus.0
The tracking system of many sorts and varieties continues to
appear. The "partner track," is open to every new graduate of a
prestigious law school. It is the path to power and wealth. The "mommy
track" is defined by gender. Other tracks include many new possibilities
and are referred to by a variety of names. Each track has one common
denominator, attorneys are defined by their ability to generate revenue for
the firm, which then becomes a measure of their commitment to the firm.
Although the partner track means that you are committed to the
firm and could attain partner status, the "mommy track" is reserved for
women for whom there is no partner track. Thus, in some firms special
arrangements are negotiated for women who choose to work limited hours.
There is no "daddy track." If you are a man and want to spend time with
your family, the message relayed is do not work with a corporate law
firm. Other tracks have a multitude of names and are in part created in
response to too many partners with not enough legal work to go around.
These names include: "contract partner," "non-equity partner," "non-
capital partner," "limited partner," "permanent associate," and "toy
partner." One associate analyzed it this way:
It used to be every "normal joe" could make partner. Now it is
more competitive. We are of the baby boom generation and
there is not enough legal work to cover the high volume of
attorneys in the marketplace. It used to be up or out. Either
you became a partner or you were forced to leave the firm.
It's no longer like this. It's not a profession any more, but it's
big business. Lawyers are a commodity.P
Some corporate attorneys who do not make partner status move
on to set up their own practices, while others remain permanent associates
or "toy partners." The bottom line is again traced to commitment in hours
as established through revenue generation. The term "toy partner"
62. Id.
63. Id.
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signifies an attorney who is not a serious full-time attorney, one not
considered fully committed to the firm. There is no capital investment
required, no voting rights, and no equal share of the profits. In sum,
attorney rank is defined by pay level and commitment is defined by hours
logged.
Billable hours are critical in establishing one's career track. It is
a stratified system that has long-term effects on the law; quality is
measured by money. Creativity and advocacy are replaced with
homogenization and indifference. For recent law school graduates who
dream of becoming partners in corporate law firms, the message is not to
make waves. As Duncan Kennedy pointed out in 1982, the incremental
socialization process into corporate culture begins in law school and
continues into firm culture." In exchange for the institution taking care
of all of the contingencies of life, the associate renounces any claim to
control the work setting or the content of what the lawyer does and agrees
to show the "appropriate form of deference to those above and
condescension to those below."' It has been argued that hierarchies
foster dependence, conformity, and rigidity; some do. A newly appointed
partner described his impressions of his first annual partners' meeting in
the firm's newsletter:
Even the most skeptical among us would be awestruck by their
first glimpse of the Annual Meeting - a room the size of an
airplane hangar strewn with conference tables set for 500
attorneys, name plates 'reflecting diversity rivaled only by the
United Nations, voting machines on each table, and broadcast
cameras positioned throughout the room to project the images
of each speaker recognized by the chair onto four, thirty-foot
screens positioned at the front of the conference room.... It's
unfortunate that everyone in this firm, from service clerk to
new partner, cannot view a portion of an Annual Meeting at
least once, because I think it would, give everyone doing so a
better idea of what this place is all about.'
This image of corporate lawyers presents a workplace picture of
authoritarian structure in which hierarchy is a key pattern, as is the notion
of harmony or not making waves.
Let us now shift places and examine the work lives of those
64. Kennedy, supra note 59, at 40.
65. Id. at 53.
66. See supra note 60.
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working "below" in this law firm. Complaints are the entry point in
glimpsing how the culture of hierarchy works on a day to day level when
the corporate judicial personality which is typified by "love" for the
practice of law to the exclusion of family, music, or citizenry, deals with
non-attorney staff.
It is important to reveal the inner workings of this style of law
firm and the way intense influence operates in the workplace because it
affects not only the individual employees and their families, but also
because the large firm shapes and projects the culture of the American
legal profession. The firm relies on administrators to deal with the staff
because it is less expensive than the alternative, having attorneys, who
may not be comfortable dealing with staff problems, executing such duties.
When conflicts arise within the large firm, a series of people -
administrators, attorneys, managing partners, and committees - become
involved. Administrators function as a bridge between the levels of
hierarchy. They interpret and enforce the hierarchy. Resolution is not
immediate; indeed, it may not be forthcoming at all. At times,
management responses appease rather than address issues. Catchwords are
used to hinder challenge or discourse. In the corporate setting, one often
hears about "staying competitive" when pressed about working conditions,
and "you're too sensitive" when dealing with personal issues. Catchwords
act to maintain control over people. The language is coercive. When
there is general unrest, the control language of the workplace becomes
efficiency, harmony, and the need to stay competitive.
An anonymous system for logging complaints was set up for a
brief period in a large law firm under study. Because their anonymity was
protected, workers felt free to express themselves; there was less self-
censorship. The initial response to frank, spoken worker complaints came
from the managing partner as follows:
Messages that represent ventilation of strongly held negative
feelings do not seem to seek a constructive response. Is there a
nice way for me to say that I am surprised by the tone of the
messages? (It goes without saying that the messages also hurt
the feelings of those of us who spend much of our time trying
to make this a better work place.)'
Ventilation of negative feelings disrupts harmony and efficiency of the
office and must be discouraged or silenced. Before silencing however,
other staff entered the fray:
67. See supra note 60.
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[With all due respect, and in all sincerity, intending no
hostility or negativity; look at all the benefits taken from us.
We lost our Christmas bonuses. We lost paid compensation for
unused sick leave and were forced to pay medical and dental.
Medical and dental costs were raised, and incentive for working
overtime was lost when we lost compensation for the first hour
worked after seven. The New York Tunes reports that the
average partner made $350,000 in 1990-91. . . . While they
reap top-notch pay off 'teamwork,' a large part of the team is
told they don't deserve top-notch pay due to 'market rates."
When complimented on being a staff to be proud of, someone shot back,
"[that is] like calling a Steer a Bull... he's grateful for the compliment
but would rather have restored what's rightfully his!" The manager
responded, "[p]lease explain, I don't understand this one."" Another
noted:
I agree that the support staff here is underpaid and
unappreciated. They are treated with little or no respect. But
it is not simply the support staff . . . I have seen partners
humiliate and mistreat associates, sometimes in front of clients
and many times far worse than any of the staff has been
mistreated or humiliated. 0
The managing partner responded to complaints by saying, "[w]e made
changes in benefits several years ago because we thought we needed to
make these changes to stay competitive, and to make our system
'fairer.'"' The workers responded to the double-talk by stating, "[t]here
is a general perception that the Partners' only concern is increasing their
own profits and salaries at any cost. PARTIES ARE NOT THE
SOLUTION. "' Another worker paraphrased the responses from the
administration, "[iln other words . . . maybe you should try our new
counseling program? " Another said that if management would let them
have their benefits back, there would be no need for a counseling
program. Once again the complainant is a patient, and in this instance
68. See supra note 60.
69. See supra note 60.
70. See supra note 60.
71. See supra note 60.
72. See supra note 60.
73. See supra note 60.
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able to speak only due to protection from being identified; while the
management searches for a constructive response, one that is not
"negative." Harmony and hierarchy generate powerful controls on those
who wish to voice but not exit.74
V1. THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN CONTROL
Some years ago, I was invited to a southern law school to discuss
issues of lawyer burn-out. My basic argument was over the
psychologizing of phenomena that were not about the psyche but about
power relations. The main function of professional societies might be to
advance professional responsibility and to guarantee professional
independence. Without the backing of professional societies, the law
professional is an individual having to perform an act of courage in order
to utter a simple statement of truth. The amount of courage it takes for
one simply to speak one's mind or to act on one's conscience is indicative
of the degree of authoritarianism in a system. In the case of lawyers, the
stress removes the possibility of responsible articulation of critique.
Problems which are structural in nature are called "bum-out" and
described with certain key phrases: career dissatisfaction, lawyer
unhappiness, occupational diseases. Notice some of the titles of articles on
the subject of lawyers: Attorneys are Among the Most Severely Stressed
Groups;7" Law Practice: The Thrill is Gone;' Occupational Diseases
Abound for Attorneys;" Attorney Burnout: Law and Disorder', The
Lawyers' Health: Coping with Stress;" Forty Percent of Young Lawyers
Unhappy;' Associate Blues;' Pressure Blamed for Lawyers' Divorce
74. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMN, EXIT, VoicE, AND LoYALTY (1970) (discussing
democratic styles associated with each option).
75. Gary L. Lefer, Attorneys are Among Most Severely Sressed Groups, N.Y. LJ.,
Sept. 29, 1986, at 23.
76. Andrew S. Ross, Law Practice: The Thrill is Gone, PA. LJ. REP., Sept. 8, 1986,
at2.
77. Jacob A. Stein, Occupational Diseases Bound for Attorneys, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 18,
1986, at S14.
78. Brian S. Gould, Attorney Burnout: Law and Disorder, NAT'L LJ., May 7, 1984,
at 14.
79. Christine M. Panyard, 7he Lawyer's Health: Coping with Stress, 56 N.Y. ST. BJ.
42 (1984).
80. Forty Percent of Young Lawyers Unhappy, NJ. LJ., Jan. 21, 1982, at 16.
81. Robert Henley and Barbara Cotnian Becnel, Conferees See Serious Problems in
Associate Blues, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 12, 1987, at 1.
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Rate;' The Best and the Brightest, Bored and Burned Out; Cocaine
Blues: Lawyers Said to be Vulnerable;" Lawyers Have as Much Heart
Trouble as Doctors;" The Happiest Lawyers: They Teach." The usual
solutions proposed are peer assistance, support committees, or some form
of therapy.
Psychological analysis is actually part of the control structure and
part of the problem, as with ADR mediation. In an article called Lawyer
Burnout - It Can Happen to Anyone,' two psychologists argue that the
origin of the bum-out problem was the client and client loads. The cycle
starts with continuous contact with clients and excessive caseloads.
Solutions proposed: more training in interpersonal skills in law schools,
confronting the clash of goals and expectations, and working out problems
of too high idealism. The language they used stressed "discussing
problems," "sharing feelings," "getting advice," "taking work breaks,"
"finding a sympathetic shoulder to cry on," "finding humor in the grim,"
and, using psychological support systems. Maslach and Jackson marvel:
[w]ithin the last decade, there has been a tremendous surge of
interest in the problem of bum-out. Although it was virtually
unheard of prior to the late 1970s, it suddenly became a very
popular topic. Consequently, there has been a tremendous
proliferation of workshops, training materials, and
organizational interventions planned by bum-out consultants.
Bum-out has become big business.'
When we move from justice to harmony, and from voicing to
silence, we suffer depression. This is an observation made by some of
our prominent psychoanalysts. So-called bum-out - this syndrome of
82. Michael Hall, Pressure Blamed for Lawyers' Divorce Rate, L.A. DALY J., Jan. 20,
1988, at 5.
83. Timothy Harper, The Best and Brightest, Bored and Burned Out, A.B.A. J., May
1987, at 28.
84. Nancy Blodgett, Cocaine Blues: Lawyers Said to be Vulnerable, A.B.A. J., May
1986, at 25.
85. Lawyers Have as Much Heart Trouble as Doctors, 30 CURRENT MED. FOR ATT. 13
(1983).
86. James S. Granelli, The Happiest Lawyers: They Teach, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 11,
1980, at 10.
87. Christina Maslach and Susan E. Jackson, Lawyer Burnout, 5 BARRiSTER 8 (1978)
(arguing that while bum-out can happen to anyone, those who have excessive caseloads are
particularly prone); see also Christina Maslach and Susan E. Jackson, Burnout in
Organizational Settings, 5 APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. ANN. 133 (1984).
88. Maslach & Jackson, Burnout in Organizational Settings, supra note 87.
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"emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and reduced personal
accomplishment" - has less to do with people who work with people in
some capacity, and more to do with articulate or even inchoate perceptions
of wrong and right. Burned-out professionals are the canaries in the
workplace. Something is wrong with the definition of legal work that
cannot be solved by harmonizing, such as sharing feelings or defining
problems as personal, or by moral minimalism. The hypothesis that burn-
out is characteristic of. "people work" occupations needs rethinking and
stimulates a search for more plausible explanations, one of which is found
in the substance of this paper, trading justice for harmony. A shift from
earlier concern with ethics, rights, and corporate domination to a concern
with personal and psychological states the shift from class injustices and
root causes to concerns with a syndrome of emotional exhaustion, loss of
will, malaise of spirit, and loss of energy and idealism is what one might
expect to find when hierarchy and harmony merge. Albert Camus might
have put it: When work is soulless, life stifles and dies.U
Some people react to enforced cultural uniformity; they find it
oppressive. Duncan Kennedy's work on hierarchy in legal education
stated it as part of a cumulative process:
You will come to expect that as a lawyer you will live in a
world in which essential parts of you are not represented ....
And you will come to expect that there is nothing you can do
about it. One develops ways of coping with these
expectations - turning off attention or involvement .
participating actively while ignoring the offensive elements of
the interchange, even reinterpreting as inoffensive things that
would otherwise make you boil. These are skills that
incapacitate rather than empower, skills that will help you
imprison yourself in practice.9
To use the law to empower people through democratic means has been
part of our national rhetoric. Such ideologies constitute purpose.
Democratic purpose is unlikely to be accomplished by technical training,
or an education minus a critical sense. Cultural uniformity in professional
training may be momentarily efficient, but professional training that
prepares young lawyers to understand the relationship between what they
do and the rest of the society may protect the grand vision of American
law from being reduced to narrow economic goals like billable hours. At
89. See ALBERT CAMUS, THE REBEL (1956).
90. Kennedy, supra note 59, at 57.
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any rate, it may be the gap between idealism and large firm practice of
law that renders law professionals at all levels of practice inchoate and
vulnerable to harmony ideology, unable to argue for legal contestation,91
and worse yet, unable to sift the evidence for any kind of "truth.'
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In conclusion, I return to the opening paragraphs. Why are
members of the bench and bar so vulnerable to believing the rhetoric put
forth by Chief Justice Warren Burger and his associates? Why did they
not challenge his statements that the use of the courts is excessive or that
Americans are too litigious or that informal justice is more just? While
conceding that not all or maybe even most lawyers fell prey to the
rhetoric, they were silent, and silence helped the drum beat along. The
silence continues, in spite of refutation by legal scholars, the U.S. General
Accounting Office,' 2 the Rodino Committee Report that showed no
explosion of tort actions," Business Week," and the National Center for
State Courts.' Why have our lawyers and judges not corrected the
record, when they see the business of their own courts being distorted and
when they hear American companies speak as if the American judiciary
were a part of the radical left? Many actually did believe the rhetoric,
allowed it to prevail, and participated in its dissemination, but the answer
goes beyond the hierarchical structures of our law schools and
undemocratic corporate law firms. Most certainly moral minimalism
results from an absence of critical thinking, or perhaps it is a result of a
profession in which individuals are trained to do but not to think; or from
a population immersed in therapeutic modes of thought. The lack of
critical thinking also has to do with the way in which lawyers use the
concept of evidence, the meaning of which is antithetical to its use in the
natural and behavioral sciences. Evidence is used to win, and not
necessarily to find the "truth" about a case, to separate fact from fiction,
91. See W'illiam H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal,
37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985) (discussing some of the themes of the professional vision).
92. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODucr LIABILITY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION
EXPLOSION' IN FEDERAL COURTS QUESTIONED (1988).
93. See Rodino Committee Report, Hearings on Liability Insurance and Tort Reform,
House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 1986.
94. William B. Glaberson and Christopher Farrell, The Explosion of Liability Lawsuits
is Nothing But a Myth, Bus. WK., Apr. 21, 1986, at 24.
95. VICTOR E. FLANoO ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CrS., THE BusiNEss OF STATE
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to challenge basic assumptions. Thus, along with lessons in neutralizing
emotions and moral issues an absence of critical use of evidence leads to
the "pack" mentality; follow the herd becomes the rule.
Take, for example, the issue of medical malpractice and the
notion that medical malpractice awards are out of control. The idea that
juries are increasingly moving toward bigger jury awards, although
asserted, is not supported by the empirical literature, which supports a
picture of medical malpractice at substantial variance with both the popular
press and law review articles. The Medical Malpractice Project at Duke
University Law School does not support the criticisms leveled against
juries in medical malpractice cases."
The drum beat serves as a battering ram to reduce the rights of
victims in order to sue perpetrators of harm and to pacify the public at
large. According to political writer Brownstein,7 one result of trading
justice for harmony is politics without conviction, without passion is:
[p]ragmatic candidates who tend to be less polarizing, less
critical of business interests and inclined toward solving
difficult problems with compromises that avoid creating clear
winners and losers. . . What is occurring, particularly on
economic issues is the Hands-Across-Americanization of
Democratic politics ... [b]uilding their appeals on the premise
that everyone shares the same goals and need only be
encouraged to hold hands and work together to solve the
nation's problems.'
By itself, the concept of cultural control leads neither to
explanation nor to understanding; there is no political or ideological
institution which does not exercise control, nor is there indication in the
phrase of who the agents of control are. Here Antonio Gramsci's idea of
hegemony is useful in forcing us to look at the institutions through which
dominant belief systems are transmitted." Concepts like the informal
state, or economic government help us to visualize the motivation of
organizations and professionals who seek control through pacification; but
to understand pacification or the struggle for freedom and autonomy,
96. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The Unfair Criticism of Medical Malpractice Jures, 76
JUDIcATuRE 118 (1992).
97. See Ronald Brownstein, Where's the Political Heat? Democrats Lose Their Fire,
L.A. TIMES, July 12, 1987, § V (Opinion), at 3.
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CONTROLLING PROCESSES
empirical research might be useful.'
In many American towns and cities, law avoidance and law
aversion were important historically for community survival. Consensus
and harmony were used by small religious and ethnic communities to
survive in the culture at large. But the United States is no longer a place
of isolated communities. Nevertheless, in planning the 1976 Pound
Conference, Chief Justice Burger built an ethic out of nostalgic elements
available in the culture at large and so developed a strategy that
transformed the conflict of the 1960s and 1970s that it did not effectively
threaten opposing state and corporate interests, nor did it expose the
corporate drive to restrict victims' rights through "tort reform. " '
The effectiveness of thought control is generally measured in
relation to freedom from state coercion. People who use such terms as
"manufacturing consent," as most recently Noam Chomsky,1  or
"engineering of consent," are speaking about thought controls and mind
colonization. Consent is not manufactured out of thin air; therein lies its
power. It is pieced together from the culture at hand, and as David Noble
put it in the title of his first book, it becomes America By Design.1"
The examples articulated in this paper speak of a diverse group of people
in the practice of law affected by intense influence or mind colonization.
Some of these people are elites and considered powerful while some were
in the category of litigant or subordinate worker. Intense influence is
found at all levels. As we learned by comments from uncensored
workers, there is still a critical sense at large, a "surprise factor."
Without a critical sense in law, lawyers become commodities, unable to
distinguish fact from fiction. Our vision of freedom atrophies while the
need for a body of law and a legal education that recognizes the dangers of
intense influence remains unrealized.
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